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ratification
of the
Constitution on the addition of a Bill of Rights.

Unlike Hamilton and
Madison, the States were
not convinced that a federal government of limited powers could be

Making
Ourselves
Understood

by Robert A.Destro

Editor's Note: As part of our two-year
series marking the bicentennial of the
Bill of Rights, Catholic University's
Robert A. Destro examines how we can
reach a consensus on the meaning of

the Bill of Rights despite speaking
different "dialects."

"It has been frequently remarked," wrote Alexander Hamilton in FederalistNo. 1, "that it seems
to have been reserved to the people
of this country, by their conduct and
example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men
are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are
forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident
and force."' The alternatives are as
stark today as they were in 1787: reflection and choice versus accident
and force. When the issue is one of
organic principles, thereisno middle
ground.
This was the dilemma that the
States faced when they conditioned
16

QUARTERLY w Winter 1990

trusted to respect important individual rights.
\
The freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
were simply too important to take the chance
that a distant federal
government might view
protection of basic freedoms as a priority. Only
the most thorough process of reflection and choice-the process of constitutional amendment-would suffice. The result was a Bill of Rights
that took into account the political,
cultural and religious diversity of a
nation and its people.
We would do well to keep
Hamilton's admonition firmly in
mind as we reflect on the meaning of
the Bill of Rights and the other
amendments that guarantee individual liberty and political participation. The lastdecade of the twentieth
century promises to be one of great
change in the world's political and
demographic landscape. If our conduct and example is to model how a
nation of reasonable people can agree
upon a vision of the common good
that seeks, in the words of the
Constitution's Preamble "to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, insure. domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity," then
we must begin by reflecting upon
the ideal, the Bill of Rights itself, and
how it operates in practice. In short,
before we can reflect and choose, we
must understand the choices.
The Skin of Living Thoughts
"A word," wrote Holmes, "is not
a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which

it is used."2 This observation is particularly true as applied to current
legal and political controversies involving the Bill of Rights. Though
the language the participants and
litigants use to describe their particularized vision of the common
good is that of the Bill of Rights,
there are critical differences in the
meanings attributed to its words.
Especially when applied to specific
cases such as religious liberty or
privacy, the meanings of words depends not only upon the circumstances and the time in which they
are used, but also upon the background and experience of those using them.3 While the participants in
such discussions are using the same
words-"liberty," "equal protection," "cruel and unusual punishment," and "respecting anestablishment of religion," to mention only a
few-they are not really speaking
the same language. They are speaking a dialect.
But this is neither surprising nor
particularly lamentable. America has
been a pluralistic society for as long
as there have been Americans. Our
native diversity guarantees the existence of important differences in
concept and vision. The Hamiltonian
challenge to those who would engage in discourse about the Bill of
Rights is, first, to understand one
another. Then, and only then, can
we reflect upon and choose from
among the available alternatives.
Transcending the Dialects
But how do we go about fostering such understanding and civil
discourse? Do we first need to develop a common moral language? Is
it even possible to do so? So much
has been said and written over the
years about this topic that I shall not
even attempt it here.4 My view is
that we already have a basis for
understanding-the language of the
Bill of Rights itself. All that is left is
for us to learn to speak it with one
another as we debate, in specific
terms, the vision of the common good
embodied in the Bill of Rights and
Civil War Amendments.
But that is a tall order; for a language is not merely a collection of

visual or audible symbols having a
set meaning, but a means by which
people convey a wide range of ideas,
from the mundane to the profound.
Ourrespective cultural, religious and
political backgrounds and experience condition us both to speak and
to understand a familiar dialect. It is
our own; we are comfortable with it.
We respond favorably to its sound,
and are frustrated, if not insulted,
when it becomes clear that what we
thought we said was not what was
heard.5
In an important article entitled

thereareotherwaysto envisionboth
"separation" and religious liberty.
Hamilton's challenge is to consider
and choose among them.
More recentlyJustice Blackmun,
writing for a plurality of the Court in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, wrote of the ""'logic

of secular liberty"' it is the purpose
of the Establishment Clause to protect."10 I, on the other hand, have
always believed that the purpose of
the Religion Clause was to protect
religious liberty. Do we disagree, or
are we simply speaking in dialect
6
Nomos and Narrative
, the late Profes- about different things?
sor Robert M. Cover of the Yale Law
Professor Gerard Bradley of the
School wrote:
University of Illinois School of Law
To live in a legal world requires has raised similar questions concernthat one know not only the pre- ing what Professor Laurence Tribe
cepts, but also their connection describes as "rights of religious auto possible and plausible states tonomy." Is freedom of religion, as
of affairs. It requires that one Tribeseems to suggest, nothingmore
integrate not only the 'is' and the than the secular autonomy of indi'ought,' but the 'is,' the 'ought,' viduals in matters of conscience
which depends for its protection on
and the 'what might be. 7
Since law may thus "be viewed as a a "still imperfect [judicial] vision of
system of tension or a bridge linking a 'more perfect union,"'" or is it, as
a concept of a reality to an imagined Bradley argues, something more:
alternative," 8 the language of the "immunity from state interference
cases, the treatises, the learned on matters spiritual."12
commentary and the politics speaks
Thus, if there is to be meaningful
volumes about the law's (and law- discussion of the "proper" balance
yers') vision of what is and what of rights, duties and the common
good that is the Bill of Rights, it is inought to be.
cumbent on all who would take part
in the discussion to heed both Cover
The 'What Might Be'
Does anyone familiar with the and Hamilton. Our ability to make
First Amendment doubt the impor- ourselves understood rests first on
tance of the metaphorical "wall of our willingness to understand not
separation" between church and only our own concept of the "is" and
stateas a verbalbridgebetween what the "ought" but also the "is" and the
is and what might be? Justice Wiley "ought" of our partners in discusRutledge, dissenting in Everson v. sion. Then, and only then, will it be
Board of Education, stated that "the possible toreflectand to choose some
object [of the first amendment] was mutually agreeable vision, imperbroader than separating church and fect though it mightbe, on the "what
state in [the] narrow sense [of pro- might be." a
hibiting an official church]. It was to
create a complete and permanent Endnotes
separation of the spheres of religious I A. Hamilton, J.Madison, J. Jay, The FederalPapers(1788).
activity and civil authority by com- 2-istTowne
v. Eisner,245 US. 418, 425, 38 S. Ct.
prehensively forbidding every form 158,159,62 L.Ed. 372 (1918).
of public aid or support for religion."
Compare, e.g., the remarks of Justice WilNotably, however, Justice Rutledge liam J.Brennan, Jr. to the Text and Teaching
did not rely on the language of the Symposium, Georgetown University, WashDC, October 12, 1985 (arguing that
Bill of Rights itself: he spoke in dia- ington,
"the ultimate question must be what do the
lect-of his vision of the demands of words of the text [of the Constitution] mean
liberty. It goes without saying that in our own time'), to the remarks of Judge

RobertH.Bork, to theUniversityof SanDiego
Law School, San Diego, CA, November 18,
1985(arguingthatthecurrentmeaningshould
be derived from an examination of the "core
valuels]" that the framers intended to protect).
4 A number of recent legal symposia highlight both the practical and theoretical importanceof the problem for the law, see,e.g. Symposium: Law, Community and Moral Reasoning, 77 Calif. L.Rev. 475-594 (1989); Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 12 Harv. J.
Law & Pub. Pol. 612-1008 (1989), and the
debate continues unabated in the field of
education. See, e.g. E. Beverly & R.W. Fox,
"Liberals Must Confront the Conservative
Argument: Teaching Humanities Means
Teaching About Values," The Chronicle of
Higher Education, November 1, 1989 at A52,
col. 1; Office of Educational Research and
Improvement, U.S. Dept. of Education, "Reflections on Moral Education" (October, 1989)
Doc. No. IS 89-935rib. Professor Tom Shaffer
addresses this issue of a "common language"
in the context of ethics in his review of Jeffrey
Stout's Ethics After Babel and Alasdair
MacIntyre'sAfterVirtue. [See "From theBookshelf"]
s In a paper entitled "Achieving Disagreement- From Indifference to Pluralism" and
presented at the National Symposium on the
First Amendment Religious Liberty Clauses
and American Public Life held in Charlottesville, Virginia, April 11-13, 1988, George
Weigel used a Latin axiom from Thomistic
epistemology to illustrate the importance of
perspective, language and understanding:
Quidquidrecipiturad modum recipientisrecipitur ("What is received is received according
to the mode of the receiver").
' R.M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term,

Foreword:NonosandNarrative,97Harv.L.Rev.
4

(1983) [hereafter Nomos and Narrative].

I Id. at 10.

8 Id. at 9.
9 330 U.S. 131, 67 S.Ct. 504,519 (1948) (Rutledge, Frankfurter, Burton and Jackson, J.J.
dissenting).
10 109 S.Ct. 3086,3110 (1989).
n3L.H. Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To Praisethe

ConstitutionortoBurylt,37Amer.Univ.LRev.
1 (1987).

12 G.V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Churchand State,
49 La. L.Rev. 1057,1086 (1989).
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